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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 
78-2-2(3)(j). This matter was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-2-2(4) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the court erred when granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
dismissing Mr. Briggs' breach of contract action, by concluding a binding contract to 
settle Mr. Briggs' claims existed, when there are disputed issues of fact and law about 
whether there was an unconditional acceptance to Mr. Briggs' offer or whether 
Defendants response was a counter-offer. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, \ 2 (Record, at 188-189). 
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Issue: Whether the District Court improperly weighed evidence and made findings of fact 
on disputed issues regarding Plaintiffs offer and Defendants' response to that offer. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 188-196). 
Issue: Whether the Court's conclusion of law finding Mr. Briggs' other causes of action 
to be without merit, was erroneous. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (Record, at 34-
50). 
Issue: Whether the District Court erred in finding that Mr. Briggs offer was not made 
7 
under duress. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 188-196). 
Issue: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs complaint because of a 
settlement agreement when Defendants were in breach of the ostensible settlement 
agreement, and therefore not in a position to seek enforcement against Mr. Briggs. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; (Record, at 188-196; see ^ 17; Record, at 171 specificially). 
Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, awarding 
attorney's fees when disputed material facts precluded summary judgment and where 
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Defendants admitted that Plaintiff had raised material disputed facts. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.)? Plaintiffs motion to 
summarily deny Defendants motion for summary judgment; showing Defendants' 
admission that Plaintiff had raised material disputes (Record, at 798-801). 
Issue: Whether the Distirct Court erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to statute 
(Utah Code § 78-27-56) when the undisputed facts do not fit that statute. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.). 
Issue: Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees "in the interest of 
9 
justice" without explaining how any exception to the American Rule fit this case and 
where the undisputed facts do not support such an award. 
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v. 
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115. 
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.). 
DETERMINITIVE LAW 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
Utah Code § 13-11-1 et seq (Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act) 
Utah Code § 78-27-56 (Attorney's Fees) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of case: 
This case is for damages for breach of contract, consumer protection violations, and 
fraud. Defendants counterclaimed for attorney's fees. 
Course of proceedings: 
1. Mr. Briggs filed this case on November 29, 1999. 
2. Defendants answered on March 20, 2000. 
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3. Mr. Briggs filed an Amended Complaint on September 26, 2000. 
4. Defendants answered and counterclaimed on November 29, 2000. 
5. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. (Defendants: March 15, 2001; 
Plaintiff: March 26, 2001). 
6. The Court heard Mr. Briggs' and Defendants' motions for summary judgment on 
May 22, 2001. 
7. On June 11, 2001 the Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint in a signed minute 
entry, but did not rule on Defendants' counterclaim. 
8. Defendant filed, and the Court signed, a "Final Judgment Dismissing Mr. Briggs' 
Complaint." July 3, 2001. 
9. Mr. Briggs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found the order was not final 
and dismissed the appeal without prejudice. Briggs v. Valley Spas, Inc., 2001 UT App 
410. 
10. Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2003. 
11. The District Court heard argument on Defendants' second motion for summary 
judgment ("Second MSJ"), the District Court also heard argument on Defendants' motion 
for rule 11 sanctions, which it denied. That motion is not part of this appeal. 
12. The District Court granted Defendants' Second MSJ in a signed minute entry on 
July 23, 2003. 
13. Mr. Briggs timely appealed on September 22, 2003. 
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Disposition at trial court: 
The Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint in Defendants' first motion for summary 
judgment ("First MSJ") and granted Defendants' counterclaim in Defendants' Second 
MSJ. 
Relevant facts: 
1. Between September 17, 1993 and September 16, 1995 Mr. Briggs paid Defendants 
$8,939.19, constituting full payment (Record, at 183) at Defendants' Utah State 
Fair booth for a particular model of spa and gazebo (Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1fl[ 1-3; Record, at 172-3) having been 
told by Defendants they could produce his fully-paid-for spa and gazebo whenever 
Mr. Briggs was ready to take delivery (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f^ 4; Record, at 
209). 
2. At some point, Defendants' business stopped carrying the manufacturer who made 
Mr. Briggs' spa and gazebo (Affidavit of Defendant Lowell Brown, *[j 5; Record, at 
303). 
3. Sometime in 1999, Mr. Briggs became aware that Defendants' were unable to 
honor his contract because Defendants no longer carried Cal Spas products. 
(Affidavit of Larry Briggs, ^ 5; Record, at 209 cf Affidavit of Defendant Lowell 
12 
Brown, f 2 Record, 336 "...Valley Spas dealer relationship with Cal Spas has been 
terminated...). 
4. Mr. Briggs demanded a refund (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, ^ 6; Record, at 209). 
5. Defendants refused (Affidavit of Lowell Brown, ^ 4; Record, at 248-9 cf Affidavit 
of Larry Briggs, f^ 8, 209) claiming Mr. Briggs had bought a "store credit" not a 
particular hot tub and gazebo (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 9, 209 c/Letter to 
Plaintiff from Defendants, dated November 11, 1999 ("Brown Response"); 
Record, at 185: "Current in store creditof [sic]..." c/Affidavit of Defendant 
Lowell Brown, \ 8, Record, at 337 "I never told plaintiff his only right consisted of 
a 'store credit'..."). 
6. On November 9, 1999, after much negotiation, Mr. Briggs sent Defendants a letter 
offering to settle his claim (Letter from Plaintiff to Defendants dated November 9, 
1999 ("Briggs Offer"); Record, at 184). This letter offered to accept the gazebo as 
described in his purchase contract, at the then-current higher price, and taking a 
refund on the difference. The letter further said that this matter had to be "totally 
resolved" by November 20th 1999 or Mr. Briggs would file suit Id. 
7. Defendants response, contained in Brown Response, countered by proposing to 
deliver a gazebo different from the one Mr. Briggs demanded in Briggs Offer, and 
agreeing to refund the balance to Mr. Briggs by November 18, 1999 (Brown 
Response; Record, at 185) 
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8. Brown Response further required that Mr. Briggs agree with and sign their self-
styled "proposal" before receiving his refund (Brown Response; Record at 185: "If 
you are in agreement with letter please acknowledge.... Valley Spa will issue a 
check at the same time you provide us with agreement with this letter." and 
"Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal."). 
9. Mr. Briggs considered this a counter-offer and never agreed to it (Affidavit of 
Larry Briggs, ^ 19; Record, at 109). 
10. On November 20, 1999, the date Mr. Briggs' letter had set for performance (Briggs 
Offer; Record, at 184), and two days after the Brown Response promised to deliver 
the refund (Brown Response; Record, at 185), Defendants had not delivered the 
gazebo (Affidavit of Lowell Brown, ^ 10; Record, at 275-276), nor had they 
tendered the refund (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 15; Record, at 209). 
11. Mr. Briggs waited until November 29, 1999 and, having received nothing from 
Defendants, filed the suit now at issue seeking to enforce his sales contract 
(Complaint bearing Third District Court file stamp date November 29, 1999, 
Record, at 1). 
Summary of argument: 
The District Court erred on several grounds in granting Defendants' first and second 
motions for summary judgment. 
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Defendant's first motion for summary judgment: 
The District Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint, ruling that a) the November 9, 
1999 letter from Plaintiff to Defendant (Briggs Offer) and the November 11, 1999 
letter from Defendant to Mr. Briggs (Brown Response) constituted a valid, binding 
offer and unconditional acceptance to settle Mr. Briggs' claims, and b) "Mr. 
Briggs' [other] claims do not have merit." 
The District Court erred because: 
1. The Brown Response is not an unconditional acceptance; it is a 
counterproposal, which operated to reject the Briggs Offer. 
2. The Court improperly weighed evidence and made findings of fact on 
disputed issues. 
3. The ostensible settlement agreement would not totally extinguish Mr. 
Briggs' rights. 
4. The Court's ruling on Mr. Briggs' other causes of action is sparse and 
lacks conclusions and a recitation of the facts supporting those 
conclusions, and is itself an incorrect conclusion of law. 
5. The Briggs Offer was made under duress after Defendants' unlawful 
actions, and was therefore void or voidable. 
6. Defendants themselves breached the ostensible settlement agreement, 
and therefore they were not in a position to seek enforcement against 
15 
Mr. Briggs. 
Defendants' second motion for summary judgment: 
The District Court granted attorney's fees in the second motion for summary 
judgment. This decision was erroneous because: 
1. Disputed material facts precluded summary judgment. 
2. The Court wrongly allowed attorney's fees pursuant to statute (Utah Code § 
78-27-56) when the facts do not fit that statute. 
3. The Court awarded attorney's fees "in the interest of justice" without 
explaining how any exception to the American Rule fit this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Briggs was forced to sue Defendants for breach of contract (and other 
legal claims) because Defendants refused to deliver the gazebo and spa as contracted for, 
and for which Mr. Briggs had fully paid some four years earlier, and refused to refund the 
money to Mr. Briggs. When Mr. Briggs attempted to resolve the matter with the 
Defendants by proposing the Briggs Offer, the Defendants rejected the offer and pressed 
their own counter-offer. Mr. Briggs never accepted the counter-offer. The rest of the 
litigation flows from the Defendants' dogged refusal to make good on the sale of the 
gazebo and spa or to refund the money paid. 
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The Defendants filed their first motion for summary judgment (hereafter "First MS J") 
against Mr. Briggs1 complaint. The District Court granted the First MS J and thereby cut 
off Briggs' right to a trial on the merits when the facts and law demanded otherwise. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution "assures access to the courts for the 
protection of rights and the redress of wrongs; therefore, summary judgment, which 
denies the opportunity of trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is 
no reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail." Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 nl4, (Utah 1982). 
In granting Defendants' First MS J the District Court recited some of the facts of the 
case, (improperly) weighed some disputed facts, and expressly found that "[the Briggs 
Offer] constitutes an offer. [The Brown Response] is an unconditional acceptance of Mr. 
Briggs' offer." (Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6); see also Record, at 866 (also 
Addendum, at tab 7), where the District Court implicitly repeated this finding.) The Court 
then dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint without further explanation (Record, at 375 (also 
Addendum, at tab 6)). 
I. Contrary to the District Court's Finding, The Ostensible Settlement Agreement 
Did Not Constitute an Accord and Satisfaction. 
The District Court erroneously found that the Briggs Offer and Brown Response 
constituted, as a matter of law, an accord and satisfaction (without actually calling it that). 
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"An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree that a certain 
performance offered in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon will 
discharge the obligation created under the original agreement." Petersen v. Petersen, 709 
P.2d 372, 377 (Utah 1985). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Briggs and Defendants had a contract obligating Defendants 
to deliver a particular model spa and gazebo for an agreed price - a price that Mr. Briggs 
had already paid more than four years before bringing this action. (Sales Agreement, 
Record, at 55 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). As a defense to Mr. Briggs' breach of contract 
cause of action, Defendants alleged that the parties had entered into a new agreement that 
called for the Defendants to perform in a manner different from the original contract. 
(Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, f 1 (under Counterclaim 
heading), Record, at 65). It was this ostensible agreement that the District Court 
concluded was valid and binding. (Minute Entry dated June 11, 2001 ("First ME"); 
Record, at 375 (also addendum, at tab 6)). 
The District Court erred in this finding, however, because the ostensible agreement 
did not fulfill the elements of an accord and satisfaction. "The elements essential to 
contracts generally must be present in an accord and satisfaction, including an offer and 
acceptance and a meeting of the minds." Cove View Excavating and Const. Co. v. Flynn, 
758 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1988). Specifically, Defendants did not unconditionally 
accept the Briggs Offer. Instead, the Brown Response offered different terms and thereby 
18 
rejected Mr. Briggs' offer. (Brown Response; Record, at 185 (also addendum, at tab 3)) 
"An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the 
offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer." Cal 
Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995) (emphasis 
added). In this case, the Defendants never assented to "all material terms presented" in the 
Briggs Offer. 
The Briggs Offer offered to accept the "Gazebo as described in my contract." (Briggs 
Offer; Record, at 184 (also Addendum, at tab 2)). That original contract (the final sales 
contract) specified a "grey metal" color "Omni Lux[ury]" gazebo with outside dimensions 
of 16' 7" x 12' 7". (Sales Agreement; Record, at 183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). The 
Briggs Offer further demanded that Defendants perform by November 20, 1999 (Briggs 
Offer; Record, at 184) The Briggs Offer thus called for delivery of the specified gazebo 
and refund of money by November 20, 1999 (Briggs Offer; Record, at 184 (also 
Addendum, at tab 2)); the Brown Response did not accept those terms of the Briggs offer. 
"An acceptance must be clear, positive and unambiguous.[citation omitted] ... This 
requirement is often treated as identical with the requirement dealt with in the following 
sections that an acceptance must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of the offer, and 
such changes or qualifications undoubtedly prevent an acceptance from being positive 
and unequivocal." R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah 1952) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). 
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By changing the terms of the offer, the Brown Response did not accept the Briggs 
Offer but instead counter-offered by offering to deliver an "Omni Luxury 12x16 green 
metal roof gazebo. (Brown Response; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3)). The 
Brown Response also stated: "This is the 1999 version of the product you purchased..." 
Id. Finally, the Brown Response goes on to require Mr. Briggs to agree with Defendants' 
self-styled "proposal," i.e. this counter-offer, before he could get his refund. Id. 
The Brown Response thus offered to deliver a gazebo differing in color, model year, 
and size from the gazebo specified in the original contract and in the Briggs Offer. 
Furthermore, the Brown Response required Mr. Briggs to assent to their self-styled 
proposal. 
"An offeree's proposal of different terms from those of the offer constitutes a 
counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original offeror accepts it 
unconditionally" Cal Wadsworth, at 1378 (emphasis added). 
The Brown Response makes clear that Defendants asked Briggs to assent to their offer 
(Brown Response, Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3)). "The apparent mutual 
assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from the 
language employed by them, and the law imputes to a person an intention 
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of its words and acts." Allen v. Bissinger & 
Co., 219 P. 539, 541 (Utah 1923) (emphasis added) 
Defendants' words required Mr. Briggs to expressly agree with the counter-offer: "If 
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you are in agreement with this letter please acknowledge by signing below where 
provided. Valley Spa will issue a check at the same time you provide us with agreement 
with this letter, f^ Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal" (Brown 
Response; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3); emphasis added). The reasonable 
meaning of Brown Response's words is that Defendants sought Mr. Briggs' "agreement" 
to Defendants' "proposal," The plain meaning of the Brown Response's words is that of 
an offer; not an "unconditional acceptance." Furthermore, the reasonable implication of 
Brown Response's words is that Defendants knew that their letter was an offer, not an 
acceptance 1. 
Mr. Briggs never accepted the Brown Response's counter-offer. (Affidavit of Larry 
Briggs dated March 17, 2001,119; Record, at 210 (also Addendum, at tab 4)). Therefore, 
no contract of any sort arose from the Brown Response. Accordingly, no accord and 
satisfaction existed as a result of either the Briggs Offer or the Brown Response. 
II. The District Court Improperly Made Findings of Facts When Deciding the 
First Summary Judgment. 
The District Court found that the Briggs Offer and the Brown Response created an 
1 Furthermore, the original Answer filed March 20, 2000 
does not mention the ostensible settlement agreement 
(Record, at 23-26) It is only in Defendants' Answer to 
Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, after Defendants' 
switched counsel, that the issue is raised; one year after 
Plaintiff filed this suit. (Record, at 51-67) . 
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accord and satisfaction. (First ME; Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6)). To make 
this finding, the District Court had to first find that the Defendants accepted the Briggs 
Offer. The Court's minute entry expressly says it found the Brown Response to be an 
"unconditional acceptance." (First ME; Record, at 375) "A trial court's finding about 
whether a party accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a finding of fact." Cal Wadsworth, 
1378 (emphasis added). The District Court's finding was wholly improper on summary 
judgment because "summary judgment, by definition, does not resolve factual issues." 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (cert, 
denied) (citations omitted). 
As explained above, the Brown Response was ineffective as an unconditional 
acceptance, so there was no accord and satisfaction. Likewise, there is no evidence that 
Mr. Briggs ever accepted the terms of the Brown Response, i.e. Mr. Briggs never 
expressly assented to the Brown Response as required by the express terms of that 
counter-offer. In fact, Mr. Briggs testifies in an affidavit saying: "I never accepted Lowell 
Brown's offer-proposal...." (March 17, 2001 Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 19, Record, at 
210 (also addendum, at tab 4)) 
To prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants had to offer 
undisputed facts showing every element of their defense. "The party alleging accord and 
satisfaction has the burden of proving that there has been a definite meeting of the minds 
on a new and substitute contract." United American Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 
22 
641 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1982). The Brown Response (and Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment based on the Brown Response) utterly lacked the undisputed facts to 
show that there was a "definite meeting of the minds." Thus, the District Court erred by 
granting summary judgment where material facts were in dispute. 
The appellate courts review "the trial court's legal conclusions supporting the grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, according them no particular deference," and look "at 
the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing 
party." Campbell, 840 P.2d at 137. Mr. Briggs pleaded a breach of contract claim arising 
from Defendants' failure to perform on the original gazebo contract. {See Amended 
Complaint and Jury Demand, Record, at 34-50). The undisputed facts show the existence 
of the original contract (Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, \ 
76, Record, at 44) that Plaintiff had completed his obligation to perform (i.e. he had paid 
in full) (Defendants' Second MS J, ffif 1-3; Record, at 416), and Defendants' failure to 
perform on it. (Record, at 274-275). Defendants have not offered undisputed proof to 
establish the accord and satisfaction that they alleged. (Defendants' Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Counterclaim, f 3 (under heading Affirmative Defenses), Record, at 64). 
In contract claims, summary judgment is appropriate "[o]nly when contract terms are 
complete, clear, and unambiguous..." Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. 
Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). Even a cursory reading of the 
Briggs Offer and the Brown Response show that the terms and conditions differ in the 
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two documents, and that Brown Response demands Mr. Briggs acceptance, so that they 
did not form a "clear and unambiguous" contract. 
When the facts and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Briggs, the 
Brown Response itself presents disputed questions of material fact about whether it was 
an unconditional acceptance of Brigg's Offer. The District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment and should be reversed. 
III. Contrary to the District Court's Finding, the Ostensible Settlement Agreement, 
if Valid, Would Not Extinguish Mr. Briggs' Right To Relief. 
The District Court erroneously ruled that Mr. Briggs had no rights under the original 
sales contract, and no rights under the ostensible settlement agreement the Court ruled 
enforceable. (Minute Entry dated July 23, 2003 ("Second ME55); Record, at 867 (also 
addendum, at tab 7)). Mr. Briggs has maintained that no valid settlement existed, but the 
District Court erred and imposed an injustice by ruling that Mr. Briggs5 rights under both 
the original sales contract and the ostensible agreement were extinguished. Id. 
It is undisputed that Defendants failed to deliver the gazebo and the refund. The only 
question is: which contract did the Defendants breach? The District Court initially held 
there was a settlement agreement between the Mr. Briggs and Defendant. (First ME; 
Record, at 375 (also addendum, at tab 6)). The Defendants failed to deliver the gazebo, 
even under the ostensible settlement agreement. (Affidavit of Lowell Brown dated April 
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[no day], 2001, ^ f 13; Record, at 338 (also addendum, at tab 5)). That fact positioned Mr. 
Briggs to exercise the option of suing for breach of the ostensible settlement agreement, 
or suing for breach of the underlying claim. "[A] party to the [settlement] agreement 
aggrieved by an alleged breach thereof by the other party has the option of seeking to 
enforce the settlement agreement, or regarding the agreement as rescinded and moving 
against the other party on the underlying claim." L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. 
Co., Inc., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). 
Because Mr. Briggs had the option of suing under either the original contract or the 
ostensible settlement agreement, the District Court erred by granting summary judgment 
against Mr. Briggs on both contracts at the same time. "Where a motion for summary 
judgment is clearly based upon one or the other theory of recovery, (enforcement or 
rescission), an election may be deemed to have been made, since the two theories must be 
regarded as separate and distinct claims, and summary judgment is granted only as to 
one of the individual claims, rather than as to the case as a whole" Id. (emphasis 
added, footnote omitted). 
The District Court first ruled and dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint, but the Court's 
ruling was silent on Mr. Briggs' remaining rights. (First ME; Record, at 372-375 (also 
addendum, at tab 6)). Mr. Briggs, assuming that he could not pursue an action on the 
original contract, waited for Defendants to perform under the "settlement agreement" 
Defendants had urged the Court to find. After two more years with no performance, Mr. 
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Briggs filed a motion to revive the underlying action based on Defendants' 
nonperformance. (Motion to Revive Underlying Action; Record, at 685). The District 
Court denied this motion, stating: "Again, the Court confirms its earlier ruling and finds 
that Mr. Briggs breached the Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, that breach ultimately 
relieved Defendants of any duty they had to perform under the Agreement." (Second ME; 
Record, at 867 (also addendum, at tab 7)). 
This ruling means that Mr. Briggs has no rights under the original claim and none 
under the ostensible settlement agreement—he is stripped naked at the bar of justice. 
For their part, Defendants expressly elected to pursue the ostensible settlement 
agreement. "Defendants respectfully submit that in the circumstances of this case, the 
parties' Settlement Agreement should be summarily enforced..." (First MS J; Record, at 
177-8) Therefore, the District Court's ruling that Mr. Briggs had no claim under either the 
original contract or the "settlement agreement" is erroneous and an affront to justice. The 
Court's ruling must be reversed. 
IV. The District Court Improperly Granted Defendants' First Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Other Claims 
The District Court erred in granting Defendants' First MS J when it tersely ruled 
"Mr. Briggs' claims of duress, deceptive layaway plans, and violations of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act do not have merit." (First ME; Record, at 375 (also 
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addendum, at tab 6)). 
Mr. Briggs had a constitutional and common law right to a trial unless the 
undisputed facts and law clearly support summary judgment. See Utah State University, 
646 P.2d 715 n.14. The District Court's grant of summary judgment cut off Briggs1 right 
to a trial on the merits when the facts and law demanded otherwise. 
"The courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about 
whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be 
resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." Colman v. Utah 
State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); see also Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. 
Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966)( "A motion for summary judgment is a harsh 
measure, and for this reason plaintiffs' contentions must be considered in a light most to 
his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go to trial; and only if 
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, 
should the motion be granted.") 
Plaintiff Mr. Briggs Properly Pleaded A Consumer Sales Practices Act 
Violation Claim. 
Defendants committed at least 3 violations of Utah and Federal consumer protection 
laws: 
1. Mr. Briggs was not properly notified of his 3-day right to rescind (Sales 
Agreement; Record, at 182 (also addendum, at tab 1)). Defendants violated 16 
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CFR § 429 (see addendum, at tab 14), which requires specific notice of the right to 
rescind on all sales over $25 made at "the buyer's residence or at facilities rented 
on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention 
centers, fairgrounds..." 16 CFR § 429.0(a). The rule is stated in 16 CFR § 429.1 
(see addendum, at tab 14), the pertinent portions read: 
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and 
deceptive act or practice for any seller to: 
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of any 
contract pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution, which is in the 
same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally used in the oral sales 
presentation and which shows the date of the transaction and contains the 
name and address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space 
reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer or on the front page of 
the receipt if a contract is not used and in bold face type of a minimum size 
of 10 points, a statement in substantially the following form: 
"You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of 
the third business day after the date of this transaction. See the attached 
notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right." ... 
"(f) Misrepresent in any manner the buyer's right to cancel. " 
The Utah Legislature has declared that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
"shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: ... (4) to make state 
regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection." Utah Code § 13-
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11-2 (see addendum, at tab 13). Under the Utah Act, Defendants' failure to give a 
rescission notice constitutes a deceptive act or practice. Utah Code § 13-1 l-4(m) 
(see addendum, at tab 13). The sale was over $25 (Sales Agreement; Record, at 
183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)) and it took place at the Utah State Fairgrounds 
(Amended Complaint and Jury Demand; Record, at 35-36), which is a facility 
rented "on a temporary or short-term basis." 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a) (see addendum, 
at tab 14). 
2. Defendants deceptively insisted that Mr. Briggs had purchased a "store 
credit," not a spa and gazebo (Brown Offer; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at 
tab 3) c/Sales Agreement; Record, at 183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). Defendants' 
statement violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code § 13-11-
4(1) (see Addendum, at tab 13) because the statement indicated that Mr. Briggs 
contract was not for a spa and gazebo, but rather a store credit. 
3. Defendants refused to give Mr. Briggs a refund when they could not deliver 
the paid for merchandise (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001, f^ 8; 
Record, at 209). Defendants' refusal violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act, Utah Code § 13-11-1 et seq. generally and § 13-11-4(1) (see Addendum, at tab 
13)requiring a refund where supplier unable to deliver within 30 days). 
The District Court's Ruling Leaves Mr. Briggs unable to fully address the 
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merits because of its lack of grounds 
The District Court gave no reasons why it ruled Mr. Briggs' additional claims were 
without merit. The District Court's failure to explain its ruling violated the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) which requires written conclusions of fact and law: "The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground." The District Court's failure also now prevents Mr. Briggs from 
addressing its ruling on the merits. This Court should reverse the District Court's ruling 
and remand for proper consideration of the merits of all of Mr. Briggs' causes of action. 
V. The Briggs Offer was void or voidable because it was made under duress 
The District Court erred when it found the Briggs Offer a valid offer (First ME, 
Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6)). Mr. Briggs was under duress when he made 
the offer, duress caused by Defendants' wrongful behavior, and leaving Mr. Briggs with 
no reasonable alternative. 
Mr. Briggs had paid the full amount (almost $9,000) on his contract over four years 
earlier. Defendants insisted that they would not honor their end of the contract. 
Defendants insisted that the only thing Mr. Briggs could do with his contract was work 
some new bargain. The resulting Briggs Offer was very much to Defendants favor. Mr. 
Briggs had paid for one of Defendants' best spas and gazebos but was forced, by 
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Defendants' unlawful acts, to consider accepting far less than he had bargained and paid 
for (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001; Record, at 209 (also Addendum, at 
tab 4)). Defendants' deceptive acts and false claims (see discussion supra on the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act violations) forced Mr. Briggs to bargain against himself 
when the law, unbeknownst to him, was on his side. 
Defendants, under a statutory obligation to obey the law, are seeking to benefit 
because of their violation of those laws. Had Mr. Briggs known of his rights, i.e. if 
Defendants had obeyed the law, Mr. Briggs never would have bargained against his best 
interests (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001, ^ 33; Record, at 210 (also 
Addendum, at tab 4)). 
Mr. Briggs asks this Court to rule that the Briggs Offer was void or voidable by reason 
of being made under duress, i.e. threatening to convert his contract for a spa and gazebo 
(as he had bargained for) into a virtually unusable store credit, by failing to give him 
required notice of his rights to rescission, and by falsely telling him he could not get a 
refund. 
Duress requires two elements: 1) an improper threat that 2) leaves the other party with 
no reasonable alternative, see Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993). 
"[A]n improper threat may be found when (i) the resulting exchange is no1 on fair 
terms, and (ii) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is 
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat." Andreini v. 
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Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah 1993). 
Clearly, Mr. Briggs was getting less than he had originally bargained for, and paid for. 
Defendants had had his money for more than four years without delivering on their 
obligation, then they threatened to illegally convert his paid-for spa and gazebo into a 
virtually unusable "store credit." Because of Defendants' continuing violations of 
consumer protection law, Larry Briggs was turned from an arm's length negotiator to a 
beggar on his knees, seeking any scrap Defendants would deign to offer. 
"[A] contract may be voided [i]f a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an 
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative." 
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993). Mr. Briggs' alternatives were to 
bargain to pay a much higher price for the gazebo he already paid, and had a contract for, 
forget about the spa, and get a small refund, or get nothing. 
Besides Defendants' violations of consumer protection laws discussed supra, 
Defendants' acts also violated their obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The District 
Court allowed a malefactor to benefit from his malfeasance by obligating Mr. Briggs to 
an offer made by wrongful coercion. This should not stand and the District Court's ruling 
should be reversed. 
VI. The District Court could not properly enforce the ostensible settlement 
agreement because the Defendants were not in compliance and had not 
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performed. 
Defendants argued that there was a settlement agreement and that Mr. Briggs 
breached it by filing suit. (Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, 
Tf 1 (under Counterclaim heading), Record, at 65). The District Court erred in accepting 
this argument, not only because there was no acceptance, as argued supra, but Defendants 
were themselves not in compliance with their argued-for agreement. 
"Neither party to an agreement can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to 
a judgment for damages or a decree for specific performance) until the other party has 
tendered his own performance." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp,.M6 P.2d 1238, 1243 
(Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although Defendants had told the district Court that they had performed on the 
ostensible agreement (Record, at 176; First MS J, heading II, "Defendants have performed 
their side of the settlement agreement"), Defendants later admitted they have not 
performed saying "it would be foolhardy for Defendants to perform..." (Record, at 693). 
The District Court erred when it enforced the ostensible agreement against one 
party while the other party was in default. This ruling should be reversed. 
VII. The District Court erred in granting Defendants5 Second MSJ, granting 
attorney's fees. 
Mr. Briggs filed his opposition to Defendants' Second MSJ (which asserted 87 so-
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called undisputed material facts) and properly disputed a substantial number of 
allegations (Record, at 572 et seq) that Defendant certified to the Court (pursuant to Rule 
11(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) as "UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS." (Second 
MSJ; Record, at 417). Because there were disputes over "facts" that Defendants conceded 
were "material," the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
ff[I]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. ... if there is any dispute as to any 
issue, material to the settlement of the controversy, the summary judgment should not be 
granted." HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) emphasis added); 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (same rule, same 
language). 
In his memorandum opposing Defendants' Second MSJ, Mr. Briggs disputed fflf 4-6, 
8, 12, 15, 17-19, 22-23, 25-26, 28-31, 33, 35, 38, 40-43, 48-49, 51, 53-54, 62, 65, 69, 78 
of Defendants' Second MSJ (Memorandum in Opposition to Second MSJ; Record, at 533 
et seq.). For example: f^ 5 of Defendants' Second MSJ alleges as an undisputed material 
fact the following: "On November 11, 1999 Defendants unconditionally accepted Mr. 
Briggs' settlement offer." (Second MSJ; Record, at 418). Mr. Briggs disputes this with 
eight pages of discussion, citing to affidavits 26 times (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Second MSJ; Record, at 533-540). Whether the Defendants accepted the Briggs Offer is a 
fact that is absolutely necessary to deciding whether there was any settlement agreement, 
34 
which is a necessary element to proving lack of merit. The "fact" of acceptance was 
controverted; it was error for the District Court to weigh this highly-contested "fact" and 
grant summary judgment. 
Defendants, in response to Mr. Briggs' challenge to their Second MS J, filed a motion 
for Rule 11 sanctions (Record, at 699 et seq.). (The District Court rightly denied this 
motion (Second ME; Record, at 867 (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001; 
Record, at 209 (also Addendum, at tab 7))). In Defendants' reply memorandum in support 
of their Rule 11 motion Defendants conceded Mr. Briggs had raised disputes of 
material facts: "Defendants challenge only those falsehoods which are relevant to 
[Defendants'] Counterclaim. Mr. Briggs made these false representations in an attempt to 
raise material disputes of fact precluding summary judgment on the Counterclaim. The 
materiality of each misrepresentation is discussed below." (Record, at 747; emphasis in 
original). 
Defendants, having conceded that the disputes were material, did not ask the Court to 
withdraw their Second MS J even though Utah law does not allow summary judgment 
where material facts are in dispute. Mr. Briggs, therefore, moved the Court to summarily 
dismiss Second MS J (Record, at 798) on grounds that the dispositive issue was settled. 
In Defendants' memorandum opposing Mr. Briggs' summary motion (Record, at 825) 
the argument reaches the absurd: "Any residual disputes of fact are not 'material' within 
the meaning of Rule 56..." (Record, at 826, emphasis in original). What Defendants now 
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dismiss as "residual disputes of fact" (having previously called them "material" (Record, 
at 747; emphasis in original)) in this case were not just material, they were critical. The 
District Court wrongly granted summary judgment where the movant admitted disputes of 
material facts ("The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see 
Addendum, at tab 12)). 
The District Court's granting of summary judgment should, therefore be reversed. 
VIII. The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to statute 
The District Court erroneously granted Defendants' Second MS J granting attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Section 78-27-56 (see Addendum, at tab 11). The District Court's 
ruling failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and its decision 
was erroneous as a matter of law. 
Section 78-27-56 states in pertinent part: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith... 
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This statute does not broadly authorize a court to award attorneys fees at the court's 
discretion or because a party prevails in a lawsuit. "Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code is 
narrowly drawn and not meant to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits. To 
safeguard against an overly broad application, a prevailing party must demonstrate two 
distinct elements before a court may award attorney fees; namely, that the claim is (1) 
without merit, and (2) not brought or asserted in good faith." In re Discipline of 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 46 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Our Supreme Court earlier declared: "Under the plain language of this statute, 
attorney fees are appropriately awarded only if the trial court determines that three 
requirements are met: (1) the party seeking fees prevailed; (2) the claim or defense 
asserted by the opposing party was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in 
bad faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must make specific 
findings, see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) 
(emphasis added) ("Specific findings further the ends of justice by allowing appeals 
courts to better review the trial court's award."). "Absent specific findings, the basis of the 
award cannot be determined." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997). 
The District Court's ruling, set forth in its signed minute entry of July 23, 2003, states: 
"Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 ... the Court awards attorney's fees 
as a result of Mr. Briggs' breach." (Second ME; Record, at 866 (also Addendum, at tab 
7)). The Court's ruling does not make any of the findings required by law. Chipman, 934 
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P.2d at 1161. As a matter of law, the ruling is thus insufficient to support an award of 
attorneys' fees. 
What is worse, the District Court's terse and uninformative ruling raised the issue of 
motive or bias. At oral argument on July 22, 2003, Defendants' counsel stated: 
Now Mr. Briggs has made it clear he's going to appeal and Your Honor, I would 
suggest - and I'm going to be a little more practical and explicit than I'd usually be in 
a court and if I'm speaking (inaudible) I ask for the Judge's forgiveness, if the Judge 
splits the baby this litigation will continue because Mr. Briggs will appeal and we'll 
keep rolling up fees. If the Judge awards a substantial attorney's fee award that will 
give us room to negotiate and compromise and hopefully put a stake through the heart 
of this thing. 
(Transcript of July 22, 2003 Oral Argument; Record, at 893, page 25, lines 9-17). 
This revealing statement shows Defendants' counsel asking the Court to join on his 
side and thwart Mr. Briggs' right to appeal. "The right to an appeal is a valuable and 
constitutional right and ought not to be denied except where it is clear the right has been 
lost or abandoned." Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947). Because of 
the District Court's terse ruling, and because the Court did not disdain this line of 
argument from counsel, Mr. Briggs has no way of knowing if the Court relied on this 
argument in making its award of substantial attorney's fees. 
Another instance of undue and unfair influence occurred after that hearing. In its 
signed minute entry of July 23, 2003, the District Court asked Defendants to "prepare an 
order consistent with this Minute Entry." (Record, at 867 (also Addendum, at tab 7)). 
Defendants sneaked an exclamation of bad faith and meritlessness into their order, trying 
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to salvage the Court's ruling. The proposed order thus recited: "[F]or the reasons set forth 
in the Court's Minute Entry dated July 23, 2003, as well as the grounds set forth in 
defendants9 memoranda, Mr. Briggs' claims are without merit, and were not asserted in 
good faith" (Record, at 885 (also Addendum, at tab 10); emphasis added). Defendants 
added language to the District Court's order - "the grounds set forth in defendants' 
memoranda" - that included by reference all of Defendants' arguments as though the 
District Court had accepted and agreed with them all. 
Mr. Briggs filed an objection to Defendants' bootstrapping of grounds into the order. 
(Record, at 875-876 (also Addendum, at tab 8)). In response to Mr. Briggs' objection, 
Defendants' counsel, Steven E. McCowin, sent an ex-parte letter to Judge Henriod 
explaining why he felt it necessary to improve upon the Court's ruling. (Letter from 
Defendants' counsel to Judge Henriod dated August 19, 2003; Record, at 883 (also 
Addendum, at tab 9)). That ex-parte letter sought to cause the court to modify its order 
without briefing or a hearing on the merits, without even being on the record. The first 
paragraph of the ex-parte letter stated: 
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 must include a finding of 
fact that the party lacked good faith, and a conclusion of law that the action was 
without merit. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932.939 n.3 (Utah 1998). To 
satisfy this requirement, Defendants included the following language in the draft Final 
Judgment: "Mr. Briggs' claims were without merit and were not asserted in good 
faith." 
(Letter from Defendants' counsel to Judge Henriod dated August 19, 2003; Record, at 
883 (also Addendum, at tab 9)). 
The Court impliedly refused Mr. Briggs' objection and acquiesced to Defendants' 
39 
manipulation of the ruling when the Court signed the Order as prepared by Defendants. 
(Final Judgment; Record, at 884 et seq (also Addendum, at tab 10)) 
Notwithstanding Defendants' liberties with the District Court's ruling, the ruling is 
still flawed on the merits. The law requires such a ruling to show why Mr. Briggs' case is 
frivolous. "[T]here [must] be substantial evidence that the claim was lacking basis in 
either law or fact and therefore frivolous..." Cady v. Johnson, 61 \ P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 
1983). The Court's minute entry (Second ME; Record, at 865 (also Addendum, at tab 7)) 
and the Final Judgment (Record, at 884 (also Addendum, at tab 10)) lack any foundation 
for a conclusion that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous. No recitation of the 
"substantial evidence" that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous appears in the District 
Court's decision. 
In addition to concluding the Mr. Briggs' case was frivolous, the District Court had to 
make a finding of fact on the requirement that the action was not brought or asserted in 
good faith. See In re Discipline ofSonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^ f 46 (second element). 
"[T]he issue of bad faith is a question of fact to be ascertained by the finder of fact." 
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997); see also Baldwin v. 
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) ("For purposes of section 78-27-56, we found 
the terms 'lack of good faith' and 'bad faith' to be synonymous.") 
To determine whether a party acted in "bad faith" requires finding that party's 
subjective evil intent. "Thus, it does not follow that simply because [a party] had no legal 
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foundation to bring the action that it was also acting in bad faith. Rather, a finding of bad 
faith turns on a factual determination of a partyfs subjective intent." In re Discipline 
of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 49 (emphasis added); see also Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149, 152 (Utah 1983) (even "pursuing a meritless claim ... does not rise to lack of good 
faith.") 
Finally, "where attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary judgment, 
the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter of law, that (1) the party is 
entitled to the award and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable." Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 110 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989). 
The undisputed facts show: 
1. Mr. Briggs paid nearly $9,000 to Defendant for a spa and gazebo (First 
MSJ; Record, at 172-3 ffl 1-3)). 
2. Defendants refused to perform under that contract (Affidavit of Lowell 
Brown; Record, at 274-275). 
3. Defendant promised substituted performance (Briggs Response; Record, at 
185). 
4. Mr. Briggs called Cal Spas to see if Defendants had placed an order for the 
gazebo they said they ordered. (March 17, 1999 Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 
16; Record, at 209). 
5. Cal Spas said Defendants had not placed an order and that they would not 
4 1 
do any business with Defendants. (Id, f 17; Record, at 209). 
6. Defendant never performed substituted performance (Record, at 693).2 
7. Mr. Briggs has received nothing for his money (Record, at 693). 
Viewing these facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party cannot lead to a finding that Mr. Briggs acted in bad 
faith. Taylor, 770 P.2d at 169 (claims that lack merit do not necessarily prove bad faith). 
These same facts militate against the conclusion that Mr. Briggs5 claim was lacking in 
either law or fact, or was frivolous in any respect. 
The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees and should be reversed. 
IX. The District Court erred by awarding attorney's fee "in the interests of justice" 
The District Court also justified its award of fees on the broad claim that it was "in the 
interests of justice." (Second ME; Record, at 866 (also Addendum, at tab 7)). No legal 
precedent in Utah authorizes attorney's fee awards solely "in the interests of justice." 
Utah courts have, from time immemorial, held to the American Rule: "The traditional 
American rule, and the rule in Utah, is that attorney fees are not recoverable by a 
prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract." Faust v. KAI Technologies, Inc., 
2 After an interview between Defendant Lowell Brown and 
Plaintiff's counsel Greg Smith, Mr. Brown boasted that he 
was going to build the gazebo he had procured for Plaintiff 
and drop it off at Mr. Smith's office in the next couple of 
days.(Affidavit of Gregory B. Smith f 36; Record, at 580) 
Mr. Brown never did this either. (Affidavit of Gregory B. 
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2000 UT 82, If 17. 
Faust raised a claim for attorney's fees that was not authorized by statute or contract. 
The Faust appellants argued that Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com'n, 885 P.2d 759 
(Utah 1994) (awarding attorney's fees on a private attorney general doctrine), created a 
new and broad right to attorney's fees. The Faust court wrote: 
[I]n Stewart we recognized an exception to the traditional rule and held that an 
equitable award of attorney fees was proper under the private attorney general 
doctrine, which allows for an award of fees where a plaintiff successfully vindicates 
an important public policy benefiting a larger population. In doing so, we stated 
that we note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future 
award of attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary 
case. 
Faust, [^ 18 (emphasis added). 
Defendants inexplicably rely on Faust (Second MS J; Record, 441), and its progenitor 
Stewart (Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss; Record, at 635), in 
making their claim for attorney's fees. However, Defendants failed to inform the District 
Court that Faust punctures the claim they built up from Stewart. 
Defendants have offered no grounds on which to hold that their defense against this 
breach of contract action constituted the work of a "private attorney general" vindicating 
an important public policy benefiting a larger population as, for example, a prevailing 
federal civil rights plaintiff does. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey. 447 U.S. 54, 
63 (1980) (civil rights plaintiffs serve as private attorneys general and thus serve the 
Smith 1 40; Record , a t 5 8 0 ) . 
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national interest). These Defendants, being sued for a breach of contract and violation of 
consumer protection laws, have no colorable claim to that preferred status. 
The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees "in the interest of justice" and should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred by weighing and deciding disputed material facts and 
making improper, and erroneous conclusions of law in granting Defendants' first and 
second motions for summary judgment. 
Wherefore, Mr. Briggs asks the Court of Appeals to reverse both summary 
judgment rulings and remand to the District Court for trial on the merits. 
^Tdavof.f/H DATED this r y d y of ,J , r\ ' , 2004. 
5 
Gregory B. Smith 
Attorney for Mr. Briggs 
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ABS Equipment Enclosure Incur 
Heavy Duty 5 /8" Thick Redwood Cabinet IncJ^f 
Heavy Duty 5 /8 * Thick Cedar Siding Cabinet IncQ 
Not IncQ $ 
Not IncQ L . $ , 
Not IncQ ^ 
Not IncQ $' 
Not IncXX $ 
Not IncQ $ Full Foam Insulation . „™ .™. . IncJL . ^ . ...^^, y^ ........
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v:: 
vo 
Spa Delivery IncQ\ Not IncQ 7 $ 
Gazebo Assembly Inct3f Not IncQ . / . $ 
Gazebo Shade Canopy Cover IncQ Not IncQ .,./... $ 
Crane Charges are NOTJncluded- Cal Spas Does Not Arrange or Pay for Cranes.....*;.™ $ 
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LSAD SOURCE 
Tab 2 
* w r w a u c i y, i ^ W 
I\L*. L-uweu Drown 
ATTN: Larry Briggs 
This letter is in response to you not getting back with me stating your position on whether you were 
willing to except my last offer made to you to settle my dispute with Valley Spa. Again I will 
reiterate my offer. On Thursday (11-4-99) over die phone I told you that I was willing to pay the 
current high price of $5,995.00 + applicable tax for the Gazebo as described in my contract I also 
told you that my original contract states that delivery and setup was included. However, I said that as 
long as you could provide me with the setup instructions that I would be willing to set it up myself 
I also stated that after paying Valley Spa for the Gazebo that there was a remaining balance on my 
contract of around $2,570.00. Because this amount isn't enough to purchase a spa to my satifaction I 
told you that you would have to refund this amount back to me. 
You, responded by saying something to the affect of "well, with the high cost of shipping and the 
price of redwood going through the roof these days, I don't know if I would be willing to do this 
either, don't get me wrong, Fm not saying that I won't except this offer and on the other hand Fm not 
saying that I will, however if you'll let me think about it over night 111 call you tomorrow morning 
with my answer". Since we had this conversation on Thursday and you hadn't got back in contact 
with me as late as Monday I made an appointment to see a Contract Attorney on Tuesday. 
After speaking with him, he told me the first thing that I should do is write you this letter before we 
pursue legal action against Valley Spa. I have now sent you this letter by certified maiL If you do not 
except my offer as described above we will settie this in court. My attorney told me that usually m 
this type of case the court awards the original contract price + a set fee of 10% accumulative yearly 
interest 
If you do not except this offer and it goes to court, Fm suing for the return of the contract price + 
interest (not any of Valley Spa products) Til take my money else where to make my purchase. 
Mr. Brown you now have until November 20, 1999 to get back with me and totally resolve this 
issue. If it is not resolved by this date, we will settie it in court 
You can contact me by phone at 968-3738. If I am not at home you can leave a message, the 





3935 So. REDWOOD ROAD • SALT LAKE CITY • UTAH • 84123 (801) 972-1215 
6835 So. STATE STREET 4 SALT LAKE CITY • UTAH • 84047(301)568-7050 
November 11, 1999 
Larry Briggs 
4950 So. 4095 W. 
Kearns, UT 84118 
801-968-3788 
Re: Previous spa and gazebo purchase. Current in store creditof $8,939.19. 
Dear Larry, 
i s per your request I have ordered an Omni Luxury 12X16 green metal roof gazebo by Cal 
>pa. This is the 1999 version of the product purchased on September 16, 1995. The agreed 
ipon price is stated in my October 21, 1999 letter to you, the Better Business Bureau, and 
lie Utah Division of Consumer Protection. 
a addition, Valley Spa has agreed to pay the balance of the contract by November 18, 
999. Our agreement is as follows: $5995.00 plus tax of $380.60 totaling $6,375.68 will be 
ibtracted from the current in store credit of $8,939.19. The balance of $2,563.51 will be 
aid to you. If you are in agreement with this letter please acknowledge by signing below 
here provided. Valley Spa will issue a check at the same time you provide us with 
;reement of this letter. 
lank you for your time and consideration of this proposal. 
ncerely, 
( 
well Brown /' 
ry 




Fax (801) 532-5178 
THIRD DISTRIST COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Larry Briggs } Affidavit of Larry Briggs 
} 




Valley Spas, Inc; Salt Lake Valley Spas, } Judge Henriod 
Inc.; Lowell Brown; Valley Spa I, Inc } 
} 
Respondent } 
I Larry Briggs having been sworn under oath do testify according to my personal knowledge and belief the following: 
1: If called to testify I would truthfully state the following; 
2:1 bought a spa and gazebo from defendants because I thought they were manufacturers of these things. 
3: Had I known that defendants were not manufactures of these products I never would have intrusted them with my money. 
4:1 was told by employees of the defendant that I could retrieve my Cal Spas products anytime in the future. 
5: In 19991 discovered thru a service man that works for defendants, that defendants no longer carried Cal Spa products. 
6:1 was alarmed that defendants had not bothered to notify me of this 
7: On or about September 1999 on two seperate occasions, I demanded that I be given a refund 
8: However, I was refused a refund, once by a salesman, the next time by Lowell Brown 
9. Lowell Brown told me that I had to spend my (store credit) on current merchandise on current prices, he also told me that 
there would be no way that I could receive similar products that I had purchased in my contract because prices had gone up 
and styles had changed. He also told me that I had to either accept a lesser gazebo or a lesser hot tub but he wasn't willing to 
give me the similar sizes and styles acccording to my contract. At this point I felt coerced to settle with Lowell Brown on 
terms that would be acceptable to him, or I would get nothing. I never bargained for a (store credit), I bargained for specific 
goods. 
10; I did not agree to this, so against my will I finally began to dicker with him. 
11:1 was coerced into making an offer of settlement with Valley Spa. 
12:1 wrote Lowell Brown a letter on or about November 1999, in it I demanded several things. 
13:1 had demanded setup instructions for the gazebo, which he did not except. 
14:1 did not agree to his new offer because I needed the setup instructions 
15:1 specifically told Lowell Brown that I had to have my refund by November 20, 1999,1 still have not received any 
refund from Loweu urown, ne also never ordered the gazebo I demanded. 
16. On or about November 13th or 14th, I called Cal Spas to see if Lowell Brown had ordered a gazebo in my name. 
17. They told me that they no longer or at any time in the future would do business with Lowell Brown or Valley Spas 
18: On or about November 18th I called Lowell Brown, and he said to me that if he found out that I had contaced Cal Spas 
that he would kill the deal and that I would have to take him to court and that it would cost me a whole lotta money. 
19:1 never accepted Lowell Browns offer-proposal and signed it like he requested. 
20: Lowell Brown told me that He thought the setup instructions were included in the crate, but this was not acceptable to 
me. 
21:1 would only accept an offer by Valley Spa if 1: either the setup instructions were included, or 2: Vally Spa agreed to 
build the gazebo for me as my original contract stated, this was very important because building a deluxe 12' x 16' gazebo is 
like adding an addition to ones home. 
22:1 could not get Lowell Brown to specifically agree to one or the other. 
23:1 understood from Lowell Browns tone of voice that he was sick of dealing with me and if the set up instructions were 
not included that that would be my problem and not his. 
24:1 waited until November 29th to see what Lowell Brown was going to do if anything. 
25: The last conversation that I had had with Lowell Brown led me to believe that all dealings with him had been killed 
because I had called Cal Spas. 
26: Lowell Brown did not order the Cal Spa Omni Luxury gazebo as described in my contract. 
27: Valley Spa was not ready to deliver any gazebo to me because they never called or contacted me to tell me they had it. 
28: Valley Spa was not willing to deliver any gazebo to me because Lowell Brown told me that he would kill the deal if I had 
contacted Cal Spas in any way, shape or form. 
29: After that statement, I told him I had contacted Cal Spas. 
30: We hung up and I understood that all negotiations or dealings were killed. 
31:1 would never agree to buy anything new from an unauthorized dealer. 
32: Had Lowell Brown told me that he was going to try to sell me a gazebo or hot tub that he had to secretly get thru 
another dealer I would have never agreed to it. 
33: Had I known that I had a right to a refund, I would not have negotiated with Lowell Brown, because what he was 
willing to do for me was not acceptable to me, but he had me over a barrel and acting against my will under duress. 
Dated this 17th day of March 2001. 
U»* 
Larry D. priggs 
STATE OF TENNESSEE 
COUNTY OF MONROE 
Personally appeared before mef J o / ; q4(iV\//pr , a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, 
the within named LARRY D. BRJuGS, with whose identity was proven to me on the basis of satisfactory 
evidence, and who acknowledgedtbat he executed the within instrument for the purposes therein contained. 
Witness my hand and seal t h i s / ^ J a y of/^fr?/fr ,2001. 
[ AT),/ ^/sn^Xf' 
Tab 5 
Steven E. McCowin (#4621) 
435 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 582-6529 
Attorney for defendants and counterclaimants 
Lowell Brown and Valley Spa I, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION II 
LARRY BRIGGS, ] 
Plaintiff and ] 
Counterclaim Defendant, ] 
vs. ] 
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE ; 
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL ; 
BROWN; VALLEY SPA I, INC. ; 
Defendants, and ] 
Counterclaimants ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
I LOWELL BROWN 
) Civil No. 990911916 
) Judge Henriod 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Lowell Brown, being duly sworn and on my oath, state as follows: 
1. Except where indicated to the contrary, the information set forth herein is based 
upon my personal knowledge, and if called to testify I would truthfully testify as follows: 
2. Although Valley Spa's dealership relationship with Cal Spas has been terminated, 
Valley Spa continues to have a very limited business relationship with Cal Spas. For example, on 
occasion Cal Spas will authorize Valley Spa to perform warranty work on Cal Spas' products. In 
addition, on occasion Valley Spa is able to purchase parts from Cal Spas. 
3. No reasonable, objective person who visited Valley Spas' Utah State Fair exhibit 
in 1993,1994, or 1995 could have come to the conclusion that Valley Spas was a manufacturer of 
spas or gazebos. 
4. I maintain a close supervision over the salesmen employed by Valley Spa, and am 
aware of the types of representations that they make on behalf of Valley Spa. No salesman of 
Valley Spa would ever have told a customer that he or she could take delivery of purchased 
goods at any point in the future. 
5. Prominently displayed at Valley Spa's Utah State Fair exhibit in 1993, 1994, and 
1995 were signs stating that Valley Spa's prices were guaranteed for one year. 
6. Although Valley Spa is no longer a Cal Spas dealer, it has every right to sell Cal 
Spas products which it has acquired. 
7. Pursuant to the parties' Settlement Agreement, defendants have already procured 
for plaintiff the gazebo called for in his original contract with defendants. The particular model of 
spa called for in the original contract between plaintiff and Valley Spa is no longer manufactured 
by Cal Spas. 
8. I have never told plaintiff that his only right consisted of a "store credit" of 
$8,939.19 that he could apply to Valley Spa's current products. 
9. Defendants have never exercised any duress over plaintiff or forced him to do 
anything against his will. 
10. At the time Valley Spa entered into the original contract with plaintiff^  and for a 
substantial period of time thereafter, Valley Spa had the spa and gazebo models specified in that 
contract either in stock or available for prompt shipment. By waiting for four years before he 
requested delivery the spa and gazebo, plaintiff substantially frustrated Valley Spa's performance 
of that contract. During the four-years delay, Valley Spas had changed manufacturers; Valley Spa 
can still obtain Cal Spa gazebos and spas, but Cal Spa no longer manufactures the particular 
model of spa called for in the contract. 
11. Defendants have never attempted to persuade plaintiff to "repudiate" anything. 
12. Defendants never "killed" or in any other way repudiated the parties' Settlement 
Agreement. 
13. Defendants are ready, willing, and able to perform all of their obligations under the 
Settlement Agreement, subject to their rights of off-set in accordance with any damages awarded 
to them on their counterclaim against plaintiff. 
14. Plaintiffs suggestion that the modest amount of money here as issue should be 
maintained in any sort of separate trust account, escrow account, or interest-bearing account for 
the benefit of plaintiff or that the money here at issue amounts to any significant '^ working 
capital," are silly and false. Such assertions bespeak a total unfamiliarity with commercial reality. 
15. Although the supplier through whom Valley Spa procured the gazebo called for in 
the parties9 Settlement Agreement has asked that his name not be publicly disclosed, there is 
nothing commercially unreasonable about this procurement process. 
16. After plaintiff paid off the purchase price under his contract with Valley Spa, a 
number of things remained to be done under the contract First, plaintiff was required to notify 
Valley Spa to request delivery, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing required that this 
notice be given within a reasonable time frame, and not delayed so long that Valley Spa's 
performance would be frustrated 
DATED this _ day of April, 200 L ^ j 
L o ^ U B r o v ^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _ day of
 f 2001. 
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VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE 
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL BROWN, 
VALLEY SPA I, INC., 
Defendants• 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 990911916 
Plaintiff and defendants argued Motions for Summary Judgment 
to the Court on May 22, 2001. The Court took both Motions under 
advisement at the conclusion of argument, and now issues this 
Memorandum Decision. 
On September 17, 1993, Larry Briggs signed a contract with 
Valley Spas, Inc., to purchase a jetted hot tub and a Cal Spas Omni 
Luxury Gazebo for $8,494.68. Plaintiff put $500 down. Plaintiff 
claims he informed defendants he could not accept delivery on the 
tub and gazebo for several years, and that defendants replied it 
would not be a problem for them to warehouse the goods. On 
September 16, 1994, plaintiff agreed to buy additional merchandise, 
raising the total purchase to $8,939.19, and paid an additional 
$939.19. On September 16, 1995, plaintiff paid off the contract 
amount. Four years later, plaintiff attempted to take possession 
BRIGGS V. 
VALLEY SPAS PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the merchandise that he had purchased, however, in the interim 
period the defendants had stopped doing business with Cal Spas and 
did not have the same gazebo or hot tub that plaintiff had 
specified and this dispute ensued. 
On September 26, 2 000, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint 
against defendants, claiming causes of action that include, but are 
not limited to breach of contract, violations of state consumer 
sales practices law, fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary 
obligations. Plaintiff demands damages in the amount of $70,000. 
In response, the defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim, 
arguing that because plaintiff is engaged in anticipatory 
repudiation of a settlement agreement and acted unreasonably in 
violation of public policy, the Court should compensate defendants 
for their attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff's Motion is confusing, to say the least. It is 
difficult, if not impossible to determine which theories of 
liability plaintiff relies upon. For example, plaintiff alleges 
duress, but does not clearly set forth any of the elements to prove 
that cause of action. Plaintiff's Motion is denied. 
Defendants claim that plaintiff's November 9 letter was an 
offer to settle this dispute on specific terms. Defendants contend 
they accepted plaintiff's offer in their November 11 letter, 
BRIGGS V. 
VALLEY SPAS PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
accordingly asserting that a settlement agreement was created and 
plaintiff is bound under the terms of that agreement. 
The November 9 letter offered to settle the dispute and 
totally resolve the issue, stating, (1) plaintiff is willing to pay 
the current price of $5,995, plus applicable tax for the gazebo 
described in the contract; (2) even though the original contract 
included delivery and set-up, provided defendant includes 
instructions, plaintiff will do assembly himself; (3) if you do not 
accept this offer and it goes to court, I am suing for the return 
of the contract price, plus interest. 
On November 11, 1999, defendant responded to plaintiff's 
offer, stating: 
As per your request, I have ordered an Omni 
Luxury 12 x 16 green metal roof gazebo by Cal 
Spa. This is the 1999 version of the product 
purchased on September 16, 1995. Our 
agreement is as follows: $5,995, plus tax of 
$380.60, totaling $6,375.68, subtracted from 
the current in store credit of $8,939.19. The 
balance of $2,563.51 will be paid to you. If 
you are in agreement with this letter, please 
acknowledge by signing below where provided. 
Plaintiff did not sign the agreement, and 13 days after the offer 
to settle in the November 9 letter, he filed a Complaint. 
In response to defendants1 Motion, plaintiff argues there was 
no offer to settle the dispute, because plaintiff wrote the 
November 11 letter under duress (although he fails to allege the 
BRIGGS V, 
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elements of duress); and two, that there was no offer, because 
defendant informed him he was going to kill the deal because 
plaintiff had contacted Cal Spa* Plaintiff also raises the 
sentence in the November 11 letter that says, "If you are in 
agreement with this letter, please acknowledge by signing below 
where provided,ff to argue that it wasnft a complete agreement until 
he signed. 
Plaintiff1s November 9 letter constitutes an offer. 
Defendants1 November 11 letter is an unconditional acceptance of 
plaintiff's offer. Plaintiff's claims of duress, deceptive layaway 
plans and violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act do 
not have merit. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel 
for defendants is to prepare a Judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
Dated this l( day of June, 2001. 
STEPHEN L. H 
DISTRICT COURT 
Tab 7 
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CASE NO. 990911916 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
This matter is currently before the above entitled Court on 
several pending motions, including: 1) Defendants1 Motion For Leave 
To Amend Counterclaim; 2) Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment; 
3) Defendants1 Motion To Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaim; 4) 
Plaintiff's Motion To Revive Underlying Action; and 5) Defendants' 
Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions. Oral arguments were heard on July 
22, 2 003 after which the Court took the matter under advisement. 
Now, having considered the submissions of the parties along with 
the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated herein. 
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND 
Pursuant to the liberal amendment policies set forth in Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), the Court grants defendants' motion 
for Leave To Amend tiheir Counterclaim to include the phrase: "and 
by the wrongful manner in which plaintiff litigated." 
rvf w-
BRIGGS V VALLEY SPAS PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
On June 11, 2001 this Court issued a memorandum decision 
granting defendants' original Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the claims 
had been previously extinguished by the parties' Settlement 
Agreement. Now, defendants come before the Court requesting 
summary judgment on their counterclaim for the legal expenses 
incurred as a result of plaintiff's breach of the Settlement 
Agreement. In response, plaintiff asserts that his complaint was 
meritorious and not brought in bad faith. 
Consistent with its previous ruling, the Court concludes the 
undisputed facts show that plaintiff knowingly and improperly 
asserted claims which he had previously agreed to settle. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and in the 
interests of justice, the Court rules that defendants may recover 
the attorney fees incurred as a result of plaintiff's breach. 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted and plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss is denied. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVIVE UNDERLYING ACTION 
\ 
Plaintiff moves the Court to revive the underlying action 
claiming that even if there was a settlement agreement, which 
plaintiff still maintains there was not, the settlement should be 
BRIGGS V VALLEY SPAS PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
considered void due to defendants alleged non-performance. 
Essentially the same argument was made by plaintiff two years 
ago with respect to defendants1 prior Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Again, the Court confirms its earlier ruling and finds that 
plaintiff breached the Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, that 
breach ultimately relieved defendants of any duty they had to 
perform under the Agreement. Consequently, plaintiff's Motion To 
Revive The Underlying Claim is denied. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Finally, defendants move the Court for an award of sanctions 
against plaintiff's counsel, Greg Smith, in accordance with Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, defendants 
allege that Mr. Smith violated Rule 11 by filing pleadings 
containing knowingly and/or recklessly false allegations of 
material fact. Mr. Smith denies defendants claims and argues that 
Rule 11 is inapplicable. 
Upon consideration of the parties1 arguments and Rule 11 
itself, the Court declines defendants' invitation to invoke Rule 11 
sanctions against Mr. Smith. Defendants' motion for Rule 11 
sanction is denied 
Defendants' counsel is hereby requested to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Minute Entry. 
BRIGGS V VALLEY SPAS PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
Dated this 2^? day of July, 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
M<t<, 





I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this £0 Day of ^CL 
2003: 
Steven E. McCowin 
435 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Affordable Legal Advocates 
G. Brent Smith 
180 South 300 West, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
++J -
Tab 8 
Gregory B. Smith. #6657 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
180 South 300 West =170 
Salt Lake City, UT 8-1101 
Phone: (801)532-5100 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




Valley Spas, Inc.. et al 
Defendants 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Case no. 990911916 
Judge Henriod 
On July 25l 2003 the Court ruled by signed Minute Entry and instructed Defendants to prepare an 
order "consistent with this Minute Entry." (Minute Entry of July 23rd 2003. at pg 3). On August 5lh 
2003 \ Defendants served Plaintiff, by fax, their proposed Final Judgment. After discussion between 
counsels, a second proposed Final Judgment ("Proposed Judgment") was served on Plaintiffs counsel 
on August 11th 2003. 
Plaintiff objects to the following language: u, as well as the grounds set forth in the defendants5 
memoranda, plaintiffs claims are without merit and were not asserted in good faith." (Proposed 
Judgment, at 2). Plaintiff suggests to the Court that the language "grounds set forth in defendants' 
memoranda" seeks to incorporate all of Defendants' claims and arguments (not only those in their 
motion for summary judgment) into the Court's conclusions. Plaintiff notes that this is not consistent 
with the Court's Minute Entry where the Court has made its conclusion clear: "[T]he Court concludes 
the undisputed facts show that plaintiff knowingly and improperly asserted claims which he had 
1
 The cover letter attached to the first proposal was dated July 28th 2003, Plaintiff assumes this is a typo. 
previously agreed to settle." (Minute Entry of July 23r 2003. at 2). Plaintiff objects to this attempt to 
circumvent the Court's ruling to suit Defendants* desires 
Likewise, the language: "plaintiffs claims are without merit, and were not asserted in good faith." 
The Court certainK knows of these terms and Plaintiff assumes that the Court chose its language 
carefully and with full knowledge of what it was concluding. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants' 
insertion of this \erbiage is an inappropriate attempt to bend the Court's ruling to their own purposes 
and Plaintiff objects 
Wherefore Plaintiff prays that the Court reject the proposed Final Judgment and instruct 
Defendants to comph with its pre\ious ruling and prepare an ordei "consistent with this Minute 
Entry." (Minute Entry of July 23rd 2003. at pg 3). 
o 
Tab 9 
Steven Edward McCowin, Hsq. 
435 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)582-6529 
August 19.2003 
Via Fax (801) 238-7076 
The Honorable Judge Stephen L Henriod 
Third District Court for the State of Utah 
Re: Plaintiff*s Objection to Proposed Final Judgment 
Dear Judge Henriod: 
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-56 must include a finding of 
fact that the party lacked good faith, and a conclusion of law that the action was without merit. 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P,2d 932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998). To satisfy this requirement, 
Defendants included the following language in the draft Final Judgment: "plaintiffs claims were 
without merit, and were not asserted in good faith." 
PlainlilTobjects to this language, PlaintilTinsists that the Final Judgment be limited to the 
more abbreviated language of the Court's Minute Entry: ''plaintiff knowingly and improperly 
asserted claims which he had previously agreed to settle." Defendants believe that the findings 
required by Pennington are implicit in the Court's Minute lintry. Nevertheless, by objecting to the 
specific language required by Penninuton, Plaintiff seems to be trying to create a technical legal 
defect in the Final Judgment 
Defendants also understand that there are multiple bases supporting the conclusion that 
Plaintiff lacked good faith and asserted meritless claims - e.R„ Plaintiffs baseless assertions of a 
$70,000 damages claim, and a personal claim against Defendant Lowell Brown. Defendants 
therefore included the following language in the draft Final Judgment: "as well as the grounds set 
forth in the defendants" memoranda." 
Plaintiff also objects to this language. Again, Plaintiff attempts to limit the Final Judgment 
to the specific language of the Minute Entry, insisting that there is but a single factual predicate 
for the Court's judgment - that ^plaintiff knowingly and improperly asserted claims which he had 
previously agreed to settle.7' Defendants respectfully submit that the Court should reject 
Plaintiffs attempt to limit the Court's judgment to this single predicate, 
Very truly yours. 
-Stcven E. McCowin 
cc: Gregory B. Smith, Esq. 
Via Fax (801) 532-5178 
Tab 10 
T h i . . . , . . . . . . , . / , ; ' 
Steven E. McCowin (#4621) 
435 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 582-6529 
Attorney for defendants and counterclaimants 
Lowell Brown and Valley Spa I, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION II 
LARRY BRIGGS, ] 
Plaintiff and ] 
Counterclaim Defendant, ] 
vs. ] 
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE ; 
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL 
BROWN; VALLEY SPA I, INC. 
Defendants, and ] 
Counterclaimants 
) FINAL JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 990911916 
) Judge Henriod 
The first motion of defendants Valley Spa L Inc., and Lowell Brown for summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on for hearing on May 
22, 2001, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Judge, presiding. In this first motion for summary 
judgment, defendants asked the Court to dismiss the claims of plaintiff Larry Briggs on the basis 
of the parties' prior Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff appeared through his attorney, Gregory B. 
Smith; defendants appeared through their attorney, Steven E. McCowin. Having considered all 
the evidence in support of and in opposition to the motion, and having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter; 
The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that for the reasons 
set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated June 11, 2001, the plaintiffs claims were 
AUBzs z: 
*y . r_nyn_ 
Oeouty Clerk * 
extinguished by the parties' settlement agreement. 
:: I h i ! -i »K!« ORDERED, ADJUDGED. 4-x-:r DECREED that the first motion of 
defendants Valley ^ ? ^ .1 1, : c. ane ,t is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED. AND DECREED that the uunphM>< -»i 
H>laiiitill Larry Bn.;:,;.: ;x .n.vi u L,. dismissed with prejudice. 
Fhe second motion ul dc!iM i.:::i *..- : • - _w ;M- .:; :nc 1 uii 
Rules of Civil Procedure came on for hearing on July 22, 2003, the Honorable Stephen L. 
I lenrn id Judge, |)R\SR)HI?J! 11 1 his second motion lor summary judgment, defendants asked the 
Court for judgment on their counterclaim against plaintiff foi the legal expenses the> have 
incurred as a result of plaintiffs breach of the parties' settlement agreement, and as a result of the 
wront < .H--.. ;•.•:•/• riaintiff appeared through his attorney, 
Gregory B. Smith; defendants appeared through their attorney, Steven I'. Me( \>wm I" hvmg 
considered u.-; u;c evidence in support of and in opposition to the motion, and having heard and 
considered the arguments ofVounsH ;md I»MII^ lull1, advised in (lie matter; 
The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that 1 H th. u i^ons 
set Infill in iln \ \nn i',, Minute Kntn tilled July 23, 2003, as well as the grounds set forth in the 
defendants' memoranda, plaintiffs claims wei<j \\ith"«m 1 unit . 11 >• l \w MI mil asset led in ^ " d 
faith. Defendants are therefore entitled to an award of their attorn fees pursuant to Utah 
Codi1 Ann
 (S 7X-?7-S<i (|i,. 1 ,,,,,-, iiiiiflin imj., ||1;i| nH ||1C undisputed facts of this case, an award 
of attorneys' fees is appropriate in the interests ofjustice. The euuif tin r hue exneises it\ v.|uil', 
powers to award defendants the attorneys' fees they have incurred in this case. The.court further 
finds that \h*ui;-e •
 } * ;nj amount of $ ?U{Qb'l^ , and that 
2 
those fees were reasonable given the manner in which plaintiff litigated, ihe aunt tuftlia find 
that nitset against these attorneys' fees is the $8,939 19 in cash and value that plaintiff was to 
receive under the parties* settlnnnil aptniirnt, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED. AND DECREED thai defendants knv 
_ •> I" 
(lulgint nt against pLuiifili I arr> ilnggs, lor attorneys' fees in the sum of$ ((, jZy
 9 
together with interest from the date ol eiili v < tl llir^  nidtMiu'iil at the rate of % until paid 
A 
together with the costs and disbursements of this action amounting to % ^_ , making a 
In ! al )l $ l f, l£ ' • j l in .ill. and liiiti defendants have execution therefore. 
Larry Briggs resides at . Mi Mn^'s snual 
security number is . 
SUORDI'RID this ^ L da> ol
 t- y ^ t W , 2(Hh 
Judge Henriod ' 
Approved as to^bnn Appum d A\ in Unin 
Ven E. McCowin ^ ~ ^ - - - G. Brent Smith 
Attorney for Defendants Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 
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U.CA. 1953 § 78-27-56 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-27-56 Attorney's fees --Award where action or defense in baa raith 
Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the ac 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The ouri,
 ;r. . • '• discretion, m.-r au^ \ \ • ees against a party 
under Subsection > ut •,nl • ;; Uie couit 
(a) finds the party has filed an af f idava t o\ inpecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(:.•; the court enters in the nvdiij I h*» reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. I-
U.CA. 1953 § 78-27-56, UT ST § 7ft V/ >.i, 
Current through 2003 First Special Session 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U I K KCP Rule 56 
Utah Rules of Civil FUN \ dm " • ii» 
Page 1 
n 
WEST'S Ul AH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VIL JUDGMENT 
Copr © West Group 2003. All rights icserved 
< in 11 u( y tilt nut mlim lit i n \\ isil thin 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favoi upon all or any part thereof 
(b) Foi Defending Fart). A pdiiy against whom a < Linn, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, mine with oi without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion, it on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the 
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall 
be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; i^urthet lestimon); Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented oi opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith Should it appear to the satisfaction oi the court at any time that any oi the 
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule aie presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
< opi < Wt I '001 No i turn U)\ h i r 11 ^ (TIP t w f rks 
UTRRCPRule56 Page 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Pm< t dun Rtil« % 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the 
filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
[Amended effective November 1 1997 ] 
Rules ( i\ Pioi link ><> 
DTP RCPRule56 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTST§ 13-11-1 Pagel 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 11, CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
13-11-1 Citation of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act. " 
History: T,. 1973, ,-h. 188, § 1 
U. C. A. 1953 § 13 -1 1 .1 , UT ST § 13 • I J - L 
i"!i !• 1 e• nt i Ii i. -•...':i<• j h 2\i\\ \ I*''i i ,;:,;t: Spr• r\.ti\ t>ession 
C o p y r i g h t © 2 0 0 3 b y M a t t l lew B e n d e r & Compai ly , I n c . , a member of t h e 
111 ! In l.t ' x i s N e . K i H i.Ji o u p . 
LI LIU OF DOCUMENT 
O >pi © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-2 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
13-11-2 Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales 
practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppl i *-'» '" w»m - "inn1 • ' - l»:.j< < j »t j ve rind unconscionable 
sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with 
the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act. relating to consumer-
protection; 
(si to make uniform the law, i ricluding the administra tive rules, with respect 
l:o the subject; of this act among those states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply with the 
provisions of this act. 
2. 
'J.C. 
Current through 2 003 First Special Session 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-3 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
13-11-3 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly or indirectly for 
money, credit, property, financial assistance, or any other thing of value on 
the plea or representation that it will be used for a charitable purpose. A 
charitable solicitation may be made in any manner, including: 
(a) any oral or written request, including a telephone request; 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any handbill, written 
advertisement, or publication; 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or request of donations for any 
book, card, chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise, 
subscription, ticket, flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, trinket, 
tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in connection with which any 
appeal is made for any charitable purpose, or where the name of any 
charitable organization or movement is used or referred to as an inducement 
or reason for making any purchase donation, or where, in connection with any 
sale or donation, any statement is made that the whole or any part of the 
proceeds of any sale or donation will go to or be donated to any charitable 
purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete when made, whether 
or not the organization or person making the solicitation receives any 
contribution or makes any sale. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or 
other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods , services, or other 
property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), 
including the use or misuse of personal identifying information of any person 
in relation to a consumer transaction to, or apparently to, a person for 
primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes that relate 
to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or 
property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has 
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with 
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to 
any of these transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as 
defined in this section. 
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division of Consumer Protection. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-3 
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that 
determines the rights of the parties and concerning which appellate remedies 
have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, governmental 
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, 
cooperative, or any other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, brok er, or other 
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, 
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 3; 1983, ch. 58, § 4; 1987, ch. 105, § 2; 2000, ch. 
57, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-3, UT ST § 13-11-3 
Current through 2 003 First Special Session 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-4 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
13-11-4 Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates thi s chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive 
act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consu mer transaction has sponsorship, 
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it 
has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular 
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if 
it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the 
fact ; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer tra nsaction is available to the 
consumer for a reason that does not exist; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in 
accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in 
greater quantity than the supplier intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not; 
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the 
supplier does not have; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a 
warranty, a disclaimer of wa rranties, particular warranty terms, or other 
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false; 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other 
benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for 
giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the 
supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit 
is contingent on an event occurring after the consumer enters into the 
transaction; 
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or 
furnish the services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if 
no specific time is advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or 
furnish the services wi thin 30 days, unless within the applicable time period 
the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either cancel the sales 
agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier or to 
extend the shipping date to a specific date prop osed by the supplier, but any 
refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer within ten business days after 
the seller receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's right to 
cancel the sales agreement and receive the refund; 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct 
solicitation sale within three business days of the time of purchase if the 
sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business 
pursuant to the supplier's persona 1 contact, whether through mail, electronic 
mail, facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct 
solicitation and if the sale price exceeds $25, unless the supplier's 
cancellation policy is communicated to the buyer and the policy offers gr eater 
rights to the buyer than this Subsection (2)(m), which notice shall be a 
conspicuous statement written in dark bold at least 12 point type, on the first 
page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as follows: "YOU, THE BUYER, 
MAY CANCEL THIS C ONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS 
DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation policy but not less 
than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR RECEIPT OF THE 
PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER."; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined 
under Title 76, Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act; 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable 
solicitation will be donated or used for a particular purpose or will be 
donated to or used by a particular organization, if the representation is 
false; 
(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle 
repair against his motor vehicle insurance policy: 
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written 
notice of: 
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the 
repair, which dollar amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or 
other copay arrangement in the consumer's insurance policy; or 
(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar 
amount a consumer was initially told he was responsible to pay a s an 
insurance deductible or other copay arrangement for a motor vehicle repair 
under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount is less than the full amount 
the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured t o pay as a 
deductible or other copay arrangement, unless: 
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the 
repair, in which case, the full amount of the repair may be charged and 
collected from the consumer; or 
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of 
money the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible 
or other copay arrangement, in which case, the supplier may charge and 
collect from the consumer an amount tha t does not exceed the amount the 
insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other 
copay arrangement; 
(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a 
consumer transaction, or any addendum to any contract, r eceipt, or other 
written documentation of a consumer transaction, any confession of judgment or 
any waiver of any of the rights to which a consumer is entitled under this 
chapter; or 
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously been 
agreed to by the consumer. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 4; 1983, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 58, § 5; 1985, ch. 
250, § 1; 1987, ch. 105, § 3; 1995, ch. 237, § 1; 1998, ch. 194, § 1; 1999, ch. 
21, § 8; 2001, ch. 196, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-4, UT ST § 13-11-4 
Current through 2003 First Special Session 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 





FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
SUBCHAPTER D - TRADE REGULATION RULES 
PART 429 - RULE CONCERNING COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR SALES MADE AT HOMES 
OR AT CERTAIN OTHER LOCATIONS 
Sec. 
429.0 Definitions. 
429.1 The Rule. 
429.2 Effect on State laws and municipal ordinances. 
429.3 Exemptions. 
Authority: Sections 1-23, FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 41-58. 
§429.0 Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part the following definitions shall apply: 
(a) Door-to-Door Sale — A sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services with a purchase price of 
$25 or more, whether under single or multiple contracts, in which the seller or his representative 
personally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and 
the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller 
(e.g., sales at the buyer's residence or at facilities rented on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel 
or motel rooms, convention centers, fairgrounds and restaurants, or sales at the buyer's workplace or in 
dormitory lounges). The term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction: 
(1) Made pursuant to prior negotiations in the course of a visit by the buyer to a retail business 
establishment having a fixed permanent location where the goods are exhibited or the services are 
offered for sale on a continuing basis; or 
(2) In which the consumer is accorded the right of rescission by the provisions of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1635) or regulations issued pursuant thereto; or 
(3) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and the goods or services are needed to meet a bona fide 
immediate personal emergency of the buyer, and the buyer furnishes the seller with a separate dated and 
signed personal statement in the buyer's handwriting describing the situation requiring immediate 
remedy and expressly acknowledging and waiving the right to cancel the sale within 3 business days; or 
(4) Conducted and consummated entirely by mail or telephone; and without any other contact between 
the buyer and the seller or its representative prior to delivery of the goods or performance of the 
services; or 
(5) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and specifically requested the seller to visit the buyer's 
home for the purpose of repairing or performing maintenance upon the buyer's personal property. If, in 
the course of such a visit, the seller sells the buyer the right to receive additional services or goods other 
than replacement parts necessarily used in performing the maintenance or in making the repairs, the sale 
of those additional goods or services would not fall within this exclusion; or 
(6) Pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, or to the sale of securities or 
commodities by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
(b) Consumer Goods or Services -- Goods or services purchased, leased, or rented primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes, including courses of instruction or training regardless of the 
purpose for which they are taken. 
(c) Seller ~ Any person, partnership, corporation, or association engaged in the door-to-door sale of 
consumer goods or services. 
(d) Place of Business — The main or permanent branch office or local address of a seller. 
(e) Purchase Price - The total price paid or to be paid for the consumer goods or services, including all 
interest and service charges. 
(f) Business Day ~ Any calendar day except Sunday or any federal holiday (e.g., New Year's Day, 
Presidents' Day, Martin Luther King's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, 
Columbus Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day.) 
§429.1 The Rule. 
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice for any 
seller to: 
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of any contract pertaining to such 
sale at the time of its execution, which is in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally used in 
the oral sales presentation and which shows the date of the transaction and contains the name and 
address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature 
of the buyer or on the front page of the receipt if a contract is not used and in bold face type of a 
minimum size of 10 points, a statement in substantially the following form: 
"You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date of this 
transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right." 
The seller may select the method of providing the buyer with the duplicate notice of cancellation form 
set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, provided however, that in the event of cancellation the buyer 
must be able to retain a complete copy of the contract or receipt. Furthermore, if both forms are not 
attached to the contract or receipt, the seller is required to alter the last sentence in the statement above 
to conform to the actual location of the forms. 
(b) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time the buyer signs the door-to-door sales contract or otherwise 
agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate, captioned 
either "NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL" or "NOTICE OF CANCELLATION," which shall (where 
applicable) contain in ten point bold face type the following information and statements in the same 
language, e.g., Spanish, as that used in the contract. 
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
[enter date of transaction] 
(Date) 
You may CANCEL this transaction, without any Penalty or Obligation, within THREE BUSINESS DAYS from the above 
date. 
If you cancel, any property traded in, any payments made by you under the contract or sale, and any negotiable instrument 
executed by you will be returned within TEN BUSINESS DAYS following receipt by the seller of your cancellation notice, 
and any security interest arising out of the transaction will be cancelled. 
If you cancel, you must make available to the seller at your residence, in substantially as good condition as when received, 
any goods delivered to you under this contract or sale, or you may, if you wish, comply with the instructions of the seller 
regarding the return shipment of the goods at the seller's expense and risk. 
If you do make the goods available to the seller and the seller does not pick them up within 20 days of the date of your Notice 
of Cancellation, you may retain or dispose of the goods without any further obligation. If you fail to make the goods available 
to the seller, or if you agree to return the goods to the seller and fail to do so, then you remain liable for performance of all 
obligations under the contract. 
To cancel this transaction, mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of this Cancellation Notice or any other written notice, or 
send a telegram, to [Name of seller], at [address of seller's place of business] NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF [date], 
I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION. (Date) (Buyer's signature) 
(c) Fail, before furnishing copies of the "Notice of Cancellation" to the buyer, to complete both copies 
by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller's place of business, the date of the 
transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by 
which the buyer may give notice of cancellation. 
(d) Include in any door-to-door contract or receipt any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of 
the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this section including specifically the buyer's right to 
cancel the sale in accordance with the provisions of this section. 
(e) Fail to inform each buyer orally, at the time the buyer signs the contract or purchases the goods or 
services, of the buyer's right to cancel. 
(f) Misrepresent in any manner the buyer's right to cancel. 
(g) Fail or refuse to honor any valid notice of cancellation by a buyer and within 10 business days after 
the receipt of such notice, to: (i) Refund all payments made under the contract or sale; (ii) return any 
goods or property traded in, in substantially as good condition as when received by the seller; (iii) cancel 
and return any negotiable instrument executed by the buyer in connection with the contract or sale and 
take any action necessary or appropriate to terminate promptly any security interest created in the 
transaction. 
(h) Negotiate, transfer, sell, or assign any note or other evidence of indebtedness to a finance company 
or other third party prior to midnight of the fifth business day following the day the contract was signed 
or the goods or services were purchased. 
(i) Fail, within 10 business days of receipt of the buyer's notice of cancellation, to notify the buyer 
whether the seller intends to repossess or to abandon any shipped or delivered goods. 
§429.2 Effect on State laws and municipal ordinances. 
(a) The Commission is cognizant of the significant burden imposed upon door-to-door sellers by the 
various and often inconsistent State laws that provide the buyer the right to cancel a door-to-door sales 
transaction. However, it does not believe that this constitutes sufficient justification for preempting all of 
the provisions of such laws and the ordinances of the political subdivisions of the various States. The 
rulemaking record in this proceeding supports the view that the joint and coordinated efforts of both the 
Commission and State and local officials are required to insure that consumers who have purchased 
from a door-to-door seller something they do not want, do not need, or cannot afford, be accorded a 
unilateral right to rescind, without penalty, their agreements to purchase those goods or services. 
(b) This part will not be construed to annul, or exempt any seller from complying with, the laws of any 
State or the ordinances of a political subdivision thereof that regulate door-to-door sales, except to the 
extent that such laws or ordinances, if they permit door-to-door selling, are directly inconsistent with the 
provisions of this part. Such laws or ordinances which do not accord the buyer, with respect to the 
particular transaction, a right to cancel a door-to-door sale that is substantially the same or greater than 
that provided in this part, which permit the imposition of any fee or penalty on the buyer for the exercise 
of such right, or which do not provide for giving the buyer a notice of the right to cancel the transaction 
in substantially the same form and manner provided for in this part, are among those which will be 
considered directly inconsistent. 
§429.3 Exemptions. 
(a) The requirements of this part do not apply for sellers of automobiles, vans, trucks or other motor 
vehicles sold at auctions, tent sales or other temporary places of business, provided that the seller is a 
seller of vehicles with a permanent place of business. 
(b) The requirements of this part do not apply for sellers of arts or crafts sold at fairs or similar places. 
